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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. 
BRADFORD LAINE SALTERS, : Case No. 20070673-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from the Sentence, Judgment, Commitments for a conviction of 
three counts of Illegal Poss/Use of Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), two counts of Forgery, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003), and Obstruction of 
Justice, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (2003), in the 
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Deno 
Flimonas, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (effective February 7, 2008) (previously codified at Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002)). See Addendum A (Judgments and Commitments). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences where the court did not consider all the statutorily required factors. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a decision to impose consecutive 
sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally 
relevant [sentencing] factors/5' (State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (citation omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give "'adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances.'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 15, 40 P.3d 626 (citation 
omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. Defense counsel brought to the court's 
attention Mr. Salter's attempts to enroll in in-patient treatment and had set up an 
evaluation date. R. 69:2. Mr. Salters also informed the court that for the purpose of 
sentencing he would "like to get in a program if possible to give [him] some help, some 
treatment." R. 69:3. Additionally, this issue can be reviewed for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
STATUTORY ROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutory provision is determinative of the issue on 
appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003). The text of this provision is located in 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 25, 2005, Mr. Salters was charged by Information with Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(4)(a); and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in 
2 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a). R. 522:1-4.] On October 4, 2005, Mr. Salters was charged by 
Information with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Forgery, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501; and Obstructing Justice, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306. R. 908:1-3. 
On April 10, 2006, Mr. Salters was charged by Information with Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Obstructing Justice, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-306; Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Unlawful Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5; 
Driving on a Denied, Suspended, Disqualified or Revoked License, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227; and Failure to Pay Fees, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1307. R. 235:13-16. On 
October 20, 2006, Mr. Salters was charged by Information with Forgery, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501; and Obstructing Justice, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306. R. 976:1-3. On July 14, 2006, 
defense counsel alerted the trial court that a petition for competency would be 
forthcoming due to the "series of seizures" Mr. Salters suffered requiring him to be 
1
 On appeal, this Court consolidated Mr. Salters' four district court cases, 051906908, 
051902522, 061906976, and 061903235. For ease of reference, Appellant references the 
last three digits of the relevant district court case number. 
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admitted to the hospital. R. 140:1. Defense counsel noted that Mr. Salters had "difficulty 
remembering not only the fact that he has cases but indeed what happened in those 
cases." R. 140:1. Defense counsel did not ultimately file a petition for competency. 
At a change of plea hearing, Mr. Salters pled guilty to three counts of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony; two counts of Forgery, a third degree 
felony; and, Obstruction of Justice, a third degree felony. R. 143:1-5. A presentence 
report was prepared for sentencing. R. 143:14; 110. The presentence report placed Mr. 
Salters in the "High Risk" category citing Mr. Salters' attitude/orientation, criminal 
history and drugs. R. 110:2. With regard to Mr. Salters' attitude, the presentence report 
notes that Mr. Salters "has been given the opportunity to comply with community 
supervision on numerous occasions." R. 110:2. However, he continued to commit 
crimes "while being prosecuted for these current offenses." R. 110:2. The report notes 
that Mr. Salters has expressed "remorse[] for his criminal conduct" but cites his 
"behavior" as "indicating] otherwise." R. 110:2. In the criminal history category, the 
report notes that Mr. Salters has been engaged in criminal activity for most of his adult 
life. R. 110:2. In the drug category, the report notes that Mr. Salters has abused "crack 
cocaine for nearly 20 years." R. 110:2. The report states that Mr. Salters has had some 
"treatment opportunities" but continues to use crack cocaine." R. 110:2. In regard to his 
criminal activity, Mr. Salters stated 
I have committed various crimes non violent^.] Have been struggling with 
mental health and substance abuse[.J I wish that I can get on track for my 
wife and kids and stop drug abuse[.] I want to be able to get back to 
working full time driving and having a life other than being depressed and 
isolating mysellj.] 
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R. 110:6. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Salters to prison for a term of zero to five years on 
all six convictions. R. 69:4. The trial court ordered the prison terms to run 
consecutively. R. 69:4. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Salters pled guilty to three counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
third degree felony; two counts of Forgery, a third degree felony; and, Obstruction of 
Justice, a third degree felony. R. 143; 235:80-87; 976:32-39; 908:64-71; 522:98-105. 
The trial court ordered a presentence report to be prepared. R. 144:13. The trial court 
warned Mr. Salters that if he did not get his presentence report completed he would "be 
sentenced to the max, which will be 30 years in prison." R. 144:14. 
On July 20, 2007, Mr. Salters was sentenced in all four cases. R. 69. Mr. Salters 
informed the trial court that he had "been working on trying to get in some in-patient 
programs." R. 69:2. Mr. Salters stated that he had an appointment later in the week to 
have an evaluation done on him to screen him for potential programs. R. 69:2. Mr. 
Salters addressed the trial court stating that he would "like to get in a program if possible 
to give [him] some help, some treatment." R. 69:3. The presentence report prepared on 
Mr. Salters recommended that he be sentenced to consecutive terms on his convictions. 
2
 Four copies of the sentencing hearing were inadvertently requested and made part of the 
record. For ease of reference, Appellant cites to only the hearing record numbered "69" 
when referring to the sentencing hearing. 
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R. 522:110. The state concurred with the presentence report's recommendation. R. 69:3-
4. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Salters to prison for a term of zero to five years on 
each of the six convictions. R.69:4; 522:115-16, 126-27; 908:76-77; 235:92-93;976:47-
48. The trial court ordered the terms to run consecutively stating: 
The reason for running [the sentences] consecutive is as follows. 
One, you have established repeated instances of criminal conduct. Two, 
these cases involve multiple charges. Three, your attitude is not conducive 
to supervision in a less restrictive setting, and you've continued your 
criminal activity subject to arrest. In addition, you have engaged in 25 
years of ongoing criminal behavior. 
R. 69:4-5. 
Mr. Salters filed a timely notice appealing each of his district court cases. R. 
522:119-20; 908:80-81, 85-86;235:96-97, 102-103; 976:51-52, 57-58. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error when it imposed consecutive sentences 
without considering all of the statutory factors mandated under Utah law. Both the 
presentence report and the trial court failed to consider Mr. Salters' rehabilitative needs. 
Absent record evidence, it cannot be presumed that the trial court properly weighed Mr. 
Salters' rehabilitative needs as mitigating circumstances before imposing consecutive 
sentences. Furthermore, the report's and the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Salters' 
circumstances were not conducive to probation did not automatically mean that the 
sentence must leapfrog from probation to consecutive sentences. The trial court's failure 
6 
to consider all the mandatory factors before imposing consecutive sentences was an abuse 
of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN IMPOSING 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WHERE THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER 
MR. SALTERS' REHABILITATIVE NEEDS. 
A trial court's "fa]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge in 
sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive 
sentence."'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). A 
trial court abuses its discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally relevant [sentencing] 
factors,'" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 
1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give "'adequate 
weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'" Helms, 2002 UT 12 at «([15 (quoting State 
v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). This Court will find a trial court has abused its 
discretion when it concludes that "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quotation omitted). 
Trial courts are required to consider statutory factors and address 
recommendations in the presentence report before imposing a sentence for more than one 
felony offense. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 21L ft 8, 52 P.3d 451. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-401 (2003), outlines the legally relevant sentencing factors a trial court is 
mandated to consider before determining whether sentences will be imposed concurrently 
or consecutively. Utah's appellate courts have noted that "[concurrent sentences are 
favored over consecutive ones." Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at *|f43. (citations omitted). 
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Section 76-3-401 states in part the following: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall 
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively 
to each other; . . . 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) - (2). Pursuant to this provision, a trial court must 
consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id.; see also Helms, 2002 UT 12 at *|9. 
Utah appellate courts have found an abuse of discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences in several cases. For example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), the 
supreme court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences because it ignored the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Id. at 244-45. The 
defendant in that case was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two 
counts of sodomy on child. Id. at 238. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences 
because the crimes were heinous, the defendant was a pedophile, and although the 
defendant's own victimization as a child was a mitigating factor, he was responsible to 
get help for himself. Id. at 244. Although these factors weighed in favor of consecutive 
sentences, the failure to consider all factors required a new sentencing hearing. IcL at 
244-45. 
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Similarly, in Galli, the supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion 
in imposing consecutive sentences because it failed to consider mitigating circumstances. 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Galli was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, 
absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years before being sentenced. See id at 932. 
Our supreme court held the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive 
sentences because: (1) although the defendant's crimes were serious, the record showed 
the trial court may not have "given adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances," 
including the fact that the defendant "did not inflict any physical injuries," only used a 
"pellet gun," and took a "relatively small" amount of money; (2) the defendant's history 
consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction," and his 
act of absconding only provided "nominal support" since he was not charged with bail 
jumping; (3) although the defendant's "offenses and flight from justice reflected] 
negatively on his character," he "voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility," 
"expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself," and, while in Minnesota, 
"obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a productive individual"; and (4) 
concurrent sentencing "better serve[ed]" his "rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board 
of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine 
progress toward rehabilitation." Id. at 938; see also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-
02 (Utah 1993) (holding trial court abused discretion by sentencing 16-year-old convicted 
of murder, child kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse of a child to consecutive sentences 
even though diagnostic report recommended "long period of imprisonment" because trial 
court's sentence assured defendant "would spend a minimum of twenty-four years in 
9 
prison," failed to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his 
extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes," and "robfbed] the Board of 
Pardons of any flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner"). 
In Perez, this Court found that a trial court erred when it sentenced the defendant 
consecutively without any indication that it had considered any of the statutory factors 
other than the "gravity and circumstances of the offense." Id. at ^ 48. In that case, the 
defendant had been convicted of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony and attempted 
murder, a second degree felony. Id. at ^20. On appeal, Perez argued, inter alia, that the 
trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive prison terms without considering 
all of the required statutory factors. Id. at ^|42. The presentence report prepared for Perez 
had recommended that he serve concurrent prison terms and the prosecutor had agreed 
with that recommendation. Id. at TJ44. In imposing sentencing, the trial court noted that 
it had heard the evidence and found that Perez's conduct in committing these offenses 
was "egregious." Id. at 45. After briefly touching on the "gravity and circumstances of 
the offense" the trial court sentenced Perez to serve his terms of imprisonment 
consecutively. Id This Court determined that "[t]he trial court's brief commentary dealt 
only with the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses,' and did not explicitly address 
the presentence report's recommendation of concurrent sentences." Id. at ^48. Nothing 
in the record indicated that the trial court "'considered] the . . . history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
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In contrast to cases overturning consecutive sentence orders, this Court upheld a 
consecutive sentence in Schweitzer, because the record demonstrated that the mitigating 
information was presented to the trial court. IdL, 943 P.2d at 652. Since the information 
presented to the trial court supported that court's finding that the defendant was '"out of 
control'" and a "'clear and present danger'" as well as the trial court's "ultimate 
conclusion to sentence defendant to consecutive prison and jail terms," this Court upheld 
the consecutive sentencing order. Id. Moreover, because the consecutive sentencing of 
two-to-five years and six months in jail did not significantly impact on the Board's 
flexibility to parole the defendant earlier, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences in Schweitzer. Id. at 652-53. 
When a trial court does not make findings as to the basis for the imposition of 
consecutive sentences and the consideration as to relevant factors, appellate courts will 
uphold the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences if it is reasonable to assume 
that the court considered all appropriate factors. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ^11. Appellate 
courts will not, however, assume that the trial court considered all required factors and 
made appropriate findings in circumstances where the record does not support such 
findings. Id. Although the trial court did not make findings regarding its sentencing 
order in Helms, the Court held that the record amply demonstrated that the trial court 
appropriately imposed consecutive sentences. Id. at ^13. The Court could assume that 
the trial court in Helms considered all legally relevant factors and made findings to 
support the consecutive sentencing order even though the court had not entered detailed 
findings because the trial court stated that it had carefully gone over the extensive 
11 
presentence report in that case. Id. That presentence report covered all the legally 
relevant sentencing factors including the '"gravity and circumstances of the offenses'" 
and the "'history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). 
Unlike Helms where the supreme court concluded that the trial court had 
considered all legally relevant factors because it indicated on the record that it had 
reviewed the presentence report, the record in this case does not demonstrate that either 
the trial court or the presentence report considered Mr. Salters' rehabilitative needs. 
Appellant argues that this issue was preserved below by defense counsel informing the 
court that Mr. Salters had been working on trying to get into in-patient treatment 
programs and had an evaluation set up for later that week and Mr. Salters stating to the 
court that he would like to get into a treatment program to get help. R. 69:2-3. However, 
in an abundance of caution, Appellant argues this issue under the ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrine. 
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance "a defendant must show (1) that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Montoya, 
2004 UT 5,1|23, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, |^19, 61 P.3d 
978 (internal quotations and further citation omitted)). In making the determination, 
appellate courts "'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is[,] the defendant must 
12 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at 1J23 (citations omitted). 
"To prevail on the first prong of the [ineffective assistance] test, a defendant 'must 
identify specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to 
meet an objective standard of reasonableness."' Id., at ^24 (citations omitted). In this 
case, defense counsel's failure to explicitly argue for probation or concurrent prison 
terms given Mr. Salters' rehabilitative needs was ineffective. As noted above, the factors 
a trial court must consider before imposing consecutive sentences are "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. Because a 
presentence report is supposed to contain detailed information regarding these factors, 
appellate courts presume that a trial court's review of the presentence report evidences 
that a trial court considered the relevant statutory factors necessary. Helms, 2002 UT 12 
at Tl 13. However, the record does not support such a presumption in this case. 
The record indicates that the presentence report and the trial court never properly 
weighed Mr. Salters' rehabilitative needs as mitigating circumstances. The presentence 
report and trial court not only failed to recognize the possibility that treatment could 
address the connection between Mr. Salters criminal conduct and his history of substance 
abuse and mental health issues, they failed to even address his rehabilitative needs. For 
example, rather than addressing Mr. Salters" potential for rehabilitation, the presentence 
report simply recognizes his lengthy drug abuse and criminal history and categorizes him 
as "High Risk." R. 110:2. The report concludes based on this assessment that Mr. 
13 
Salters "has no mitigating qualities that suggest a period of probation is appropriate. He 
has pending charges and continues to use drugs. His criminal conduct warrants a period 
of incarceration at the Utah State Prison" R. 110:2. 
Although the report notes that Mr. Salters has had a drug abuse problem for almost 
20 years, it simply states such things as he "has been given treatment opportunities but 
has had very little unincarcerated drug free time" and that Mr. Salters "denied current use 
of | drugs], but his criminal record would suggest otherwise." R. 110:15. Despite these 
conclusions, the report does not appear to equate Mr. Salters ongoing battle with mental 
health and drug abuse issues as a possible explanation of his criminal history. Even 
though there is strong evidence regarding Mr. Salters' addiction, the report appears to 
suggest that he has control over his drug use noting that Mr. Salters could not state 
"'why' he continues to use despite negative family, criminal, health and financial 
situations." R. 110:15. And while the report notes that there are no mitigators that 
"suggest a period of probation is appropriate" his rehabilitative needs are mitigators that 
do suggest that concurrent prison terms would be appropriate, allowing the Board the 
flexibility to parole Mr. Salters sooner if it concluded treatment had proven successful. 
Not only did the presentence report fail to consider Mr. Salters rehabilitative needs 
but the record indicates that the trial court itself failed to consider this required statutory 
factor. The only factors cited by the court for its decision to run the prison terms 
consecutively were Mr. Salters's criminal history, the multiple charges, criminal conduct 
and his attitude which the trial court did not think was "conducive to supervision in a less 
restrictive setting." R. 69:4. Absent any discussion of Mr. Salters rehabilitative needs, it 
14 
cannot be presumed that the trial court properly weighed this mitigating circumstance 
before imposing consecutive sentences. And while Mr. Salters' circumstances may not 
"suggest a period of probation is appropriate" or be "conducive to supervision in a less 
restrictive setting" that does not automatically mean the sentence must leapfrog from 
probation to consecutive sentences. The trial court must still consider Mr. Salters' 
rehabilitative needs when imposing sentence. Given that the trial court was mandated to 
consider Mr. Salters rehabilitative needs and failed to do so, defense counsel's 
"representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness." 
To satisfy the second prong of the ineffective assistance test, a defendant must 
show that "'but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at ^23 
(citations omitted). In this case, had defense counsel specifically argued that the trial 
court must weigh the mitigators of Mr. Salters' ongoing mental health and drug abuse 
issues along with his desire to "get help," it is reasonable to presume that the trial court 
would have imposed concurrent sentences. Addressing his rehabilitative needs, Mr. 
Salters stated 
I have committed various crimes non violent[.] Have been struggling with 
mental health and substance abuse[.] I wish that I can get on track for my 
wife and kids and stop drug abuse[.] I want to be able to get back to 
working full time driving and having a life other than being depressed and 
isolating myself[.] 
R. 110:6. 
In addition, there is evidence that Mr. Salters was hospitalized after having 
multiple seizures affecting "a lot of his long term memory." R. 140:1. Given that Mr. 
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Salters' rehabilitative needs in dealing with his mental health and substance abuse issues 
are better left up to the Board to determine, defense counsel's performance was deficient 
in failing to bring to the trial court's attention that concurrent sentencing "better serve[d]" 
Mr. Sailers' "rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release 
him from prison . . . if he has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Galli, 967 
P.2d at 938; see also Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301-02 (holding trial court abused discretion by 
failing to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative needs" and "rob[bing] the 
Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner"). But for defense 
counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable possibility Mr. Salters would have 
received concurrent sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
This Courl should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 
six consecutive sentences without considering Mr. Salters' rehabilitative needs in 
mitigation. 
SUBMITTED this &*& day of May, 2008. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
BRADFORD LAINE SALTERS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061906976 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: July 20, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk; krisl 
Prosecutor; MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN, ANDREA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : DELICINO, JEREMY M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth; January 29, 1964 
Video 
Tape Count; 9:52 
CHARGES 
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition; 04/13/2007 Guilty 
2, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/13/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No; 061906976 
Date: Jul 20, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentences in this case are to run consecutive to each other as 
well as caaes 051902522, 051906908 & 061903235. 
Dated this <^ £> day of O 
Page 2 (last) 
3RD DISTRICT COURT -|SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V0 , 
BRADFORD LAINE SALTERS, 
Defendant. 
MINTfTTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Casfc No; 0S19O3235 PS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Dat|: July 20, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk; krisl 
Prosecutor: MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN; ANDREA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELICINO, JEREMY M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 29, 1964 
Video 
Tape Count: 9;52 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBStANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/1J/2Q07 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of(ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utahlstate Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No; 061903235 
Date: Jul 20, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Cases 051902522, 051906908, 061906976 are all to run consecutive to 
each other. 
Dated this 9^> day of vJLP t 20/ 
£S 6 
DENO "HTfONffe^,,,^ „,, 
D i s t r i c t ^Tir^^gd^fe 
*-STAMP U s S ^ f g ^ W 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT IAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADFORD LAINE SALTERS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051906908 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date; July 20, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: krisl 
Prosecutort MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN, ANDREA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(a): DEL1CINO, JEREMY M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 29, 1564 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:52 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea; Guilty - Disposition: 04/13/2007 Guilty 
2. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea; Guilty - Disposition: 04/13/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison* 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051906908 
Date: Jul 20, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentences in this matter are to run consecutive to each other 
as well as cases 051902522, 061903235 & 061906976. 
Dated this day of 
STAMPUSED 
Page 2 (last) 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADFORD LAINE SALTERS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051902522 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: July 20, 2 007 
PRESENT 
Clerk; krisl 
Prosecutor! MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN, ANDREA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELICINO, JEREMY M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth; January 29, 1964 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:52 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea; Guilty - Disposition: 04/13/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison, 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff; The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051902522 
Date: Jul 20, 20 07 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Cases 051906908, 061903235, 061906976 are all to run consecutive to 
this case. 
Dated this Z-& day of C^V^e, . 20,^7 . 
^ 0 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; 
and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
l 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
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